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Abstract: The following study provides a view of the dis-
tinct freedom-from-religion metanarrative in Schiller’s 
works. The titular distinction between freedom of religion 
and freedom from religion is intended to emphasize the 
prerequisites for unfettered exercise of freedom of 
thought and freedom of conscience; namely, not only the 
guarantee of freedom to associate with one of the state-
approved religions, but the freedom to choose none of 
them and the guaranty of freedom from any state, church, 
majority, or minority coercion through religion. Schiller’s 
regulative idea regarding religion was the rejection of 
faith and subject-external belief system (“no religion”). In 
texts dating back to as early as 1779, Schiller articulates 
the reasons why religion precludes the possibility of 
genuine virtue and civilization, and thus hinders the reali-
zation of a secular republican vision; he therefore rejects 
defenses of faith, organized religion, divine judgement, 
and belief in the afterlife.  
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Uns braucht man nicht mehr 
(They don’t need us anymore) 
— Church-State Intrigant, Domingo1 
 
As Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) strongly suggests in 
“Mein Glaube” (1796) above, his regulative idea regard-
ing religion was the rejection of faith and subject-external 
belief systems — “no religion”: “Welche Religion ich 
bekenne? Keine von allen, / Die du mir nennst! ‘Und wa-
rum keine?’ Aus Religion” (NA 1:296). In texts dating 
back to as early as 1779, Schiller articulates the reasons 
why religion precludes the possibility of genuine virtue 
and civilization, and thus hinders the realization of the 
secular republican vision exemplified by Socrates’ choice 
of death over church-state coercion in Schiller’s first 
Karlschule speech, “Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leutseeligkeit 
und große Freygiebigkeit im engsten Verstande zur 
Tugend?” In “Ueber den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer 
Sitten” (1793), Schiller distinguishes between the “zufäl-
lige Tugend” produced by religion — a surrogate for true 
virtue2 — as a means toward temporary pseudo-
civilization3 and the rule of reason as the end in itself (NA 
21:37). Throughout his works and letters, Schiller rejects 
defenses of faith — “das Morsche Gebäude der 
Dummheit” (1793, NA 26:219), organized religion — 
“das künstlichste aller Gebäuden” (1795, NA 20:423) —
its method — “Verläugnung der Wahrheit” (1795, NA 
20:423). Logically, Schiller’s works also constitute a con-
sistent campaign against the belief in the afterlife — 
“Glauben an Unsterblichkeit” (1786, NA 20:122)4 and 
“Aussichten auf eine Unsterblichkeit” (1795, NA 21:37). 
Divine judgment is reduced to a mostly misunderstood 
metaphor for the evaluation of the history of human activ-
ity in “Resignation” (1786) — “Die Weltgeschichte ist 
das Weltgericht” (NA 1:168) — and portrayed as a pro-
jection of human judgment in “An die Freude” (1786) — 
“Richtet Gott wie wir gerichtet” (NA 1:171). In “An die 
Freude” (1786), joy itself is the creator and drives the 
otherwise indifferent mechanical clock (“Weltenuhr”; NA 
1:170) that is the universe. Consequently, in 1799, 
charges of atheism against his University of Jena col-
league Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) elicit a telling 
response from Schiller in a letter of 26 January. Schiller 
demonstrates no interest in Fichte’s atheism as a moral 
question; on the contrary, he encourages Fichte to defend 
his non-belief in a separate essay. Predictably, Schiller is 
interested in the unjust interference of a religious law that 
seeks to ban a theoretical discussion intended to enlighten 
readers, and encourages Fichte to seize the opportunity to 
defend freedom from religion: 
  
Was meine besondere Meinung betrifft, so hätte ich allerdings 
gewünscht, dass Sie Ihr Glaubensbekenntniß über die Religion 
in einer besonderen Schrift ruhig und selbst ohne die geringste 
Empfindlichkeit gegen das Sächsische Consistorium abgelegt 
hätten. Dagegen hätte ich [...] bewiesen, dass das Verbot Ihrer 
Schrift, selbst wenn sie wirklich atheistisch wäre, noch immer 
unstatthaft bleibe; denn eine aufgeklärte und gerechte Regierung 
kann keine theoretische Meinung, welche in einem gelehrten 
Werke für Gelehrte dargelegt wird, verbieten. Hierin würden 
Ihnen Alle, auch die Philosophen von der Gegenparthei, beige-
treten sein [...] (NA 30:26). 
 
Religion appears consistently in Schiller’s works as a sys-
tem of coercive incentives invented by “schlaue Priester” 
(1780, NA 20:54) that not only hinders the progress of 
civilizations, but in fact poses a grave danger to “das 
kühnste Ideal einer Menschenrepublik,” one based on 
guarantees of individual freedom from church-state and 
majority coercion and characterized by “allgemeiner Dul-
dung und Gewissensfreiheit” (1787; NA 22:141). These 
positions find no serious contradiction in Schiller’s writ-
ings after the last letters of his adolescence and Klop-
stockian odes in 1777, an influence Schiller distanced 
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himself from as an adult specifically due to its religious 
orientation.5 The following study provides a summary 
view of the distinct freedom-from-religion metanarrative 
in Schiller’s works, one that embarks from Hermann 
Samuel Reimarus’ (1694-1768) analysis of the wide-
spread belief in the irrational as a case of mass failure to 
read allegorically that which was written allegorically, as 
articulated in Fragmente eines Wolfenbüttelschen Un-
genannten (1774), edited by Lessing.6 It is precisely the 
common inability to read allegorically that allowed 
Schiller to defy ideological coercion and publish blas-
phemous positions by dialectically coopting and decon-
structing religious imagery and subtly drawing attention 
to its earthly sources and concerns. It is likewise a failure 
(or unwillingness) to read allegorically that allows for the 
continued interpretation of Schiller’s essentially secularist 
works as religious-morally informed, as opposed to 
moral-philosophically informed. 
 
I. 
The path to a clear view of the secularist Schiller has been 
obscured by a very large number of attempts to mission-
ize Schiller posthumously.7 These commonly embark 
from anecdotal evidence, paraphrased here: When Schiller 
was a child, he wanted to become a minister, one of the 
few attractive positions accessible to the lower middle-
class. However, Theology was not offered at the Hohe 
Karlsschule, and Duke Carl Eugen of Württemburg de-
cided that Schiller should study Law, after failing in 
which he was allowed to study Medicine. Ergo, although 
Schiller defiantly pursued a career as a dramatist and 
outspoken opponent of personal, organized, and state re-
ligion as an adult, and although he only once ironically 
wrote of his childhood ambition to be a clergyman (NA 
23:121), he can still be broadly considered a religious 
person until his death. This anecdote from Schiller’s 
childhood has a bookend in the highly questionable testi-
mony of Schiller’s servant Rudolph and his sister-in-law 
Caroline von Wolzogen that Schiller had a religious expe-
rience on his deathbed (High 2012, 154-155). This evi-
dence (and the invalid syllogism that it almost invariably 
supports) comprises the shaky sine qua non of the case 
for Schiller’s religion; it nonetheless has a firm place in 
canonical Schiller reception, as documented below. 
With few exceptions — notably in works by Joseph 
Gostwick (1882), Peter André Alt (2004), Norbert Oellers 
(2006), and Manfred Misch (1998, 2011)8 — the history 
of attempts to articulate Schiller’s attitudes toward reli-
gion is one marked by pseudo-scholarly sectarianism, 
cooptive stretches of evidence, and inflations of the sig-
nificance of plausible religious influences that do not en-
lighten and should not persuade.9 Foremost, these consti-
tute Christian usurpations and post-deathbed conversion 
attempts contingent on the willful misunderstanding and 
Christianization of Schiller’s many uses of almost exclu-
sively pagan metaphysical metaphor and the refusal or 
inability to read allegorically.10 Indeed, Schiller’s gods, as 
Henry Hatfield put it in 1964, are “romantic gods […] 
less real, less actual; we are in the world of mythology, of 
aesthetic semblance […] the Greek divinities were fic-
tions.”11 In spite of such sensible insights into the meta-
phorical nature of Schiller’s gods (and heavens), in spite 
of Schiller’s recasting of Moses from a prophet on a liter-
ally divine mission to a brilliant politician and law-giver 
on an earthly mission,12 and in spite of Schiller’s easily 
documented hostility toward organized religions, proph-
ets, and their gods, the case for Schiller the secularist re-
mains a struggle some two hundred years after the period 
Schiller described as “Zeiten des Unglaubens” (NA 
32:154). 
As a result, long held and widespread beliefs (as op-
posed to proofs) regard Schiller as “homo religiosus,”13 
and there is abundant secondary literature on his ostensi-
ble “religion” (Sell 1904),14 “essentially religious” mind 
(Bulwer-Lytton 1844),15 “religiosity” (von Wiese 1959),16 
or “spirituality”;17 his “undogmatic Protestantism” (Fricke 
1927),18 “closet Catholicism” (Rehm 1951),19 or “Swabian 
Pietism” (as a religion with a god, not as an environment 
or dialect; McCradle 1986).20 On a more theoretical level, 
the, in the context of Schillerian thought, oxymoronic 
concepts of “Religionsphilosophie,”21 “das religiös-
Sittliche,”22 “das religiös Erhabene,”23 “Liebesreligion,”24 
“Vernunftreligion” (as opposed to secular moral-aesthetic 
philosophy),25 and the popular-anecdotal concept of 
Schiller’s moral-aesthetics as “Ersatzreligion” (philoso-
phy as a substitute religion) are self-evidently confused 
directions that necessarily falsely equate religion (unsub-
stantiated belief) and obedience with reason and moral 
philosophy (the study of knowledge and experience). 
Logically speaking, reason is not a substitute for religion, 
religion is a substitute for reason, and Schiller himself ar-
gued early, often, and clearly enough that religion is 
merely a “Surrogat der wahren Tugend” (1793; NA 
26:330-331), and that true virtue can only be achieved 
through the cultivation of ennobled reason or “Veredlung 
des Charakters” (1795; NA 20:332).  
Religious conflict between states, sects, and indi-
viduals explicitly inform a majority of Schiller’s dramas 
and a number of his poems and essays. Schiller’s en-
gagement with religious problems ranges from brief ref-
erences — e.g., the murder of Huguenots by Catholics in 
Paris in Die Schaubühne als moralische Anstalt (1784) — 
to key plot elements — religious entrapment and conver-
sion of a prince in Der Geisterseher (1789) — to a central 
source of political conflict in Don Karlos (1787), Die 
Geschichte des Abfalls der vereinigten Niederlande von 
der Spanischen Regierung (1788), Die Geschichte des 
Dreyßigjährigen Kriegs (1791-92), Wallenstein (1799), 
and Maria Stuart (1800), to name only a few examples. 
Common to these historical settings is the limited and 
limiting primary concern of the religious freedom move-
ments they engage — the relative freedom of one op-
pressed group (e.g., Dutch Protestants) to pursue a reli-
gion other than that imposed on them by another group 
(e.g., Spanish Catholics). However, the freedom of a 
prince to choose which beliefs will be imposed on his 
subjects (state religion), like the freedom of a populace to 
choose native over foreign tyranny, constitutes freedom in 
only the weakest sense, one that implicitly precludes the 
rational, common constitutional goal of all who suffer re-
ligious intolerance — individual freedom from (not of) all 
forms of ideological coercion.26  
The present study’s titular distinction between free-
dom of religion and freedom from religion is intended to 
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emphasize the prerequisites for unfettered exercise of 
freedom of thought (Gedankenfreiheit) and freedom of 
conscience (Gewissensfreiheit); namely, not only the 
guaranty of freedom to associate with one of the state-
approved religions, but the freedom to choose none of 
them and the guarantee of freedom from any state, 
church, majority, or minority coercion through religion. 
Schiller’s Wallenstein trilogy (1798-1800) portrays a re-
markable exception to the princely prerogative to choose 
one religion for his subjects over another. Although there 
is nothing particularly moving about the off-stage death 
of Wallenstein in Wallensteins Tod, his demise brings 
about two directly related tragedies, 1) the lost opportu-
nity to avoid another decade and a half of religious war 
(1634-1648), and 2) the lost potential of a large central-
European state, Bohemia, that has no state religion. Re-
gardless of the Capuchin Friar’s accusations that Wallen-
stein is “[…] ein Sündenvater und muffiger Ketzer,” who 
“[r]uhmte sich mit seinem gottlosen Mund” (NA 8:33), 
Wallenstein has become a threat to the Catholic and Pro-
testant empires precisely because he is a magnet for sol-
diers who have abandoned either the Protestant King of 
Sweden or the Catholic Austrian Emperor. Arguably his 
most quotable soldier, the First Jäger, initially abandoned 
the Protestant army due to coerced piety — “Bei Gustav 
dem Schweden, dem Leuteplager! / Der machte eine 
Kirch aus seinem Lager, / Ließ Betstunde halten, des 
Morgens gleich / Bei der Reveille, und beim Zapfen-
streich” (NA 8:20) — then left the Emperor’s service due 
to a lack of personal freedom (NA 8:22). After explaining 
all of this, he threatens to murder the Capuchin Friar, an 
unwelcome representative of Catholicism at the camp, 
who criticizes Wallenstein’s lack of religion: 
“[v]erläugnet wie Petrus seinen Meister und Herrn […]” 
(NA 8:33). According to the First Jäger, for all of the ob-
vious problems caused by the unfettered freedom of the 
soldiers, Wallenstein’s camp exhibits three untimely con-
stitutional premises for the seventeenth century: freedom 
of thought and speech — “Was ich denke, das darf ich 
sagen. / Das Wort ist frei, sagt der General” (NA 8:23) — 
and freedom from religion — “Was nicht verboten ist, ist 
erlaubt; / Da fragt niemand, was einer glaubt” (NA 8:22). 
Some 150 years after the death of Wallenstein, Gedanken-
freiheit and Gewissensfreiheit are the parallel considera-
tions that bind Schiller’s Don Karlos and the constitu-
tional separation of church and state that informs the U.S. 
“Bill of Rights” and the French “Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and the Citizen” (introduced nearly simultane-
ously in 1789). Both declare the explicit guarantees of the 
individual right to express opinions on religion, and the 
freedom not to believe in, nor need feign, the observation 
of any and all conventions of faith, without consequence.  
 
II. 
The concepts of the separation of church and state, legal 
protections of freedom of religion, and freedom of 
thought and speech have a complicated history of advo-
cates and opponents, from Moses to Socrates to today.27 
In the late eighteenth century, a new demand appears in 
works that focus on the constitutional guaranty of univer-
sal freedom from religion — the advocacy of a state in 
which no individual can legally be subjected to religious 
coercion. While Schiller was a college student at the 
Hohe Karlsschule in the late 1770s, developments toward 
the legal codification of religious freedom were swift. In-
herent to the Scottish eudemonism central to Thomas Jef-
ferson’s education at the College of William and Mary 
and to Schiller’s education at the Hohe Karlsschule is a 
constitutional concern for the rights of the most vulner-
able individual and a focus on freedom and disinterested 
virtue that makes earthly happiness and the republic itself 
essentially incompatible with the coercive political, so-
cial, and private functions of organized religion.28 The fo-
cus on the quality of life — without any serious consid-
eration of an afterlife — and the accompanying concern 
for religious freedom and earthly justice strongly inform 
the documents of the American War of Independence, a 
rebellion which had in large part legitimized the pursuit of 
happiness as an actual goal of politics. The “Virginia 
Declaration of Rights,” written by George Mason (as-
sisted by James Madison) of 12 June 1776 declares that 
“all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of reli-
gion, according to the dictates of conscience.”29 Thomas 
Jefferson’s “Declaration of Independence,” ratified on 4 
July 1776, proclaimed that the guiding principle of all 
human activity is “the pursuit of Happiness” and con-
spicuously replaces traditional church-state rhetoric with 
deist moral philosophy.30 Looking back fifty years later, 
Jefferson emphasized the link between individual auton-
omy and freedom from religion, calling the “Declaration 
of Independence,” “the signal of arousing men to burst 
the chains under which monkish ignorance and supersti-
tion had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to as-
sume the blessings and security of self government.”31 
Less than a year later, in 1777, Jefferson drafted the 
“Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom” (ratified in 
1779), which demonstrates a rapid paradigm shift in libe-
ral views on the difference between freedom of religion 
— the goal of which is tolerance of different beliefs — 
and freedom from religion, which encompasses freedom 
of thought or opinion, including the protection of indi-
viduals who choose to criticize or wholly ignore religion: 
  
[…] no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any reli-
gious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be en-
forced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, 
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or 
belief, but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument 
to maintain, their opinions in matters of Religion, and that the 
same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect their civil ca-
pacities.32 
 
The “Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom” provided 
the language for the first article of the United States “Bill 
of Rights” adopted by the House of Representatives on 21 
August 1789, which became the First Amendment to the 
US Constitution (ratified 15 December 1791), in which 
the “separation of Church and State” is implied and de 
facto codified: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press […].”33 In a letter to representatives of the Danbury 
Baptist Church in 1802, Jefferson explains that the goal of 
the “Establishment Clause” is “building a wall of separa-
tion between Church & State.”34 
REVOLUTIONARY VIRTUE 
 
 79 
These same three concerns, human happiness, reli-
gious freedom, and earthly justice (among others), inform 
the documents of the French Revolution of 1789. The 
same week that the US “Bill of Rights” was adopted, in-
deed only five days later, the French “Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen” was adopted by the Na-
tional Assembly in Paris on 26 August 1789, including 
Article 10: “No one shall be disquieted on account of his 
opinions, including his religious views, provided their 
manifestation does not disturb the public order established 
by law.”35 In Maximilian de Robespierre’s “Festival of 
the Supreme Being” speech, delivered on 8 June 1794, 
Robespierre articulates a political philosophy of happi-
ness that was to be observed as if it were a religion 
handed down and enforced by a deistic creator: “He [the 
Supreme Being] created men to help each other, to love 
each other mutually, and to attain to happiness by the way 
of virtue.”36 Note that the date of “Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen” is three years to the day 
prior to the vote to honor seventeen international revolu-
tionary heroes on 26 August 1792, including Schiller. As 
will be documented below, Schiller was an excellent 
choice for this distinction due both to his belief in a tele-
ology of happiness and his popular writings portraying 
religion and the church state as primary barriers to a re-
public based on disinterested virtue and the freedom and 
happiness of the individual. 
 
III. 
Schiller’s first theoretical work on freedom is the speech, 
“Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leutseeligkeit und große Freyge-
bigkeit im engsten Verstande zur Tugend?,” which 
Schiller wrote at the age of nineteen in 1779. In keeping 
with the practice established in his earliest poems, in the 
First Virtue Speech, Schiller works on a number of meta-
phorical registers, including pagan imagery and biblical 
imagery from both the Old and New Testaments.37 In the 
fifth of twenty-three paragraphs, an unrecognizable ver-
sion of a metaphorical creator-philosopher-scientist who 
loves humankind opens a series of questions that explain 
the role of virtue in the universe: “Was wars, das den 
Weisesten leitete, eine Welt aus dem Chaos zu erheben? 
[…] Was wars das den Liebenden leitete, der neu gebo-
hrnen Welt Ordnung und Wohlklang zu geben durch 
ewige unwandelbare Gesetze?” (NA 20:4). The answer, 
the fusion of endless love and endless wisdom, appears 
less relevant to religion and physics than to politics and 
the ultimate harmony of civilization. In the seventh para-
graph, the highest “Gotheit” (deity; NA 20:5) is Jupiter. 
In the fifteenth paragraph, Schiller addresses an entirely 
nondescript nature deity in invoking Klopstock’s ode, 
“Für den König” (NA 20:7, NA21:113). The eighteenth 
paragraph is dedicated to love (NA 20:7), which is first 
“die Krone der Tugend” (NA 20:7) and then the “Erstge-
bohrne des Himmels” (NA 20:7), and features four exhor-
tations to bow before this concept of love, including one 
directed to nature, one to the human, one to an angel, and 
one to all (NA 20:7-8). In the nineteenth paragraph, 
“Weißheit! Schönste Gespielin der Liebe” appears as “das 
Meisterwerk Gottes” and “des Schöpffers großherrlicher 
Plan” (NA 20:8). These references are anchored in seven 
exhortations to worship “Weißheit,” which appears as a 
synonym for the deist concepts of “große Unendliche 
Natur” and “ewiges Uhrwerk” (NA 20:8). The paragraph 
ends with a final command to worship love, wisdom, and 
“Tugend” (NA 20:8). In the twentieth paragraph, Schiller 
appeals to the “Göttin der Wohlthätigkeit” (NA 20:8).38 
There is no way to conclude that this kaleidoscope of 
metaphors contains anything more than an allegorical ref-
erence to any orthodox form of Christianity. On the con-
trary, the elevation of wisdom to a metaphorical deity 
necessarily serves to reject and displace most of what re-
ligion has to offer. The thesis not only rejects the super-
natural-irrational aspects of religion, but also the moral 
philosophy, since Schiller — at age nineteen and at the 
very beginning of his career — has just established that 
virtue is impossible without freedom from external and 
internal coercion, and thus impossible within the confines 
of religion. 
Significantly, the speech revolves around church-
state a miscarriage of justice and Schiller’s long-time 
hero, Socrates,39 who was tried and executed for his disre-
spect for the gods by a jury pretending to be upholding a 
divine will, culminating in Socrates’ choice of death and 
freedom over life and coercion. The most remarkable 
comment on virtue and religion comes in the final two 
paragraphs (15-16) of the third segment (on moral resis-
tance, paragraphs 12-16). Again returning to “die ächte 
Tugend des Weisen” (NA 20:7) as a role model, Schiller 
switches metaphorical registers from the judgment of a 
powerful Old Testament God — who knows the source of 
all superficially good deeds at their conception and re-
wards or punishes them before they reach fruition (an al-
lusion to Socrates’ concept of retribution in the here and 
now) — to the power of virtue over the ever-changing 
demands of gods throughout history and thus the ever-
changing pseudo-virtue of religion: “Ihm [dem Weisen] 
ist sie [die Tugend] ein mächtiger Harnisch gegentrozend 
den Donnern des Himmels ein gewaltiger Schirm wenn 
zu Trümmern gehen die Himmel, wenn die Scheintugend, 
wie vor dem Winde Spreu hinwegflattert” (NA 20:7). The 
only logical conclusion to be achieved here is that while 
the virtue and wisdom of a Socrates endure, both the ap-
pearance of virtue and popular evolving religious visions 
of heaven do not. Note Schiller’s uses of “Himmel” 
(heaven) as both a singular and a plural noun. “Himmel” 
is a collective noun that already can mean “the heavens,” 
thus Schiller’s unusual use of the plural form “die Him-
mel” would appear to indicate a coming age when all 
non-metaphorical concepts of the realm of gods will col-
lapse and blow away like chaff.40 Left standing will be the 
sage, Socrates, in his impenetrable virtue. Despite the 
practical limits of freedom of speech at the Hohe Karlss-
chule, where daily prayer and an intensive curriculum in 
religion were mandatory, Christ warrants little more than 
a few veiled mentions in Schiller’s oeuvre, whereas Soc-
rates continues to be an important figure, and Schiller’s 
introduction to the First Virtue Speech implies that Socra-
tes is most sublime because of — not in spite of — his 
ignorance of Judeo-Christian revelation: “Ich sehe den 
erhabensten Geist, den je das Altertum gebahr, dem nie 
dämmerte der Offenbarung Gottes ein blasser Wieder-
stral” (NA 20:3). Of the three positive role models for vir-
tue mentioned by name, Socrates; Roman Emperor and 
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stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius (121-180 CE; NA 
20:8), who promoted stoicism over Christianity; and 
Cathmor, the paragon of virtue in James Macpherson’s 
Ossian (1760; NA 20:8); all three are pagans (at best).  
In his second dissertation of 1780, Ueber den 
Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit 
seiner geistigen, Schiller returns to the development of 
civilizations, drawing attention to the very earthly and 
human origins of the religious tribe or church state, which 
results from a conscious manipulation of the masses by 
those who know best that religions represent historical-
political stages in the evolution of communities: “Städte 
werden bevestiget, Staaten errichtet, mit den Staaten ent-
stehen bürgerliche Pflichten und Rechte, Künste, Ziffern, 
Gesezbücher, schlaue Priester — und Götter” (NA 20:54). 
Note that in Schiller’s universal historical view, after law 
books, as a rule, clever priests precede god(s), which is 
only logical, because, as Schiller’s “An die Freude” im-
plies, gods are projections that judge whatever the priests 
and adherents say they do.  
Approximately one year later, in act II of Die Räuber 
(1781), Schiller’s Karl Moor delivers a scathing criticism 
of priestcraft at work, directly to a priest, in his portrayal 
of the hypocritical enforcement of tribal state values: “Da 
donnern sie Sanftmuth und Duldung aus ihren Wolken, 
und bringen dem Gott der Liebe Menschenopfer wie 
einem feuerarmigen Moloch—predigen Liebe des Näch-
sten, und fluchen den achzigjährigen Blinden von ihren 
Thüren hinweg: stürmen wider den Geiz und haben Peru 
um goldner Spangen willen entvölkert und die Heyden 
wie Zugvieh vor ihre Wagen gespannt” (NA 3:70). To 
summarize, there is more than enough in Schiller’s earli-
est works at the Karlsschule to undo the notion that his 
early desire to become a minister might translate into a 
positive view of the role of religion in contemporary soci-
ety in his adulthood. On the contrary, Schiller’s analysis 
of Socrates as the the wisest and most sublime thinker of 
antiquity outlines the freedom-from-religion discourse 
that would inform his later works. 
 
IV. 
If the few references in Schiller’s Karlsschule works paint 
religion as a roadblock to true virtue at best and as a tool 
of enslavement and murder at worst, Schiller’s post-
doctoral works are more direct in regard to the role of aes-
thetics and morality in the ultimate evolution from the 
church state to the ideal of a secular republic. In 1784, in 
“Die Schaubühne als Moralische Anstalt,” Schiller dem-
onstrates the inhumane consequences of the religious state 
in action: “Christus Religion war das Feldgeschrei, als 
man Amerika entvölkerte — Christus Religion zu ver-
herrlichen […] schoss Karl der Neunte auf die fliehenden 
Hugenotten zu Paris” (NA 20:89-90).  Less direct, yet 
more insidiously subversive, is the poem that would go on 
to become an almost instant folk song long before the ap-
pearance of Beethoven’s melody in 1824. Schiller’s ode 
“An die Freude” is often falsely invoked as a text that ex-
emplifies his own personal dualistic hovering between the 
secular and the religious, a misreading on a basic level 
that results in further canonical misinterpretations. 
Schiller’s admittedly confusing references to heaven, 
God, and religion somehow become foremost Christian 
concepts in the eyes of readers,41 although the poem itself 
begins with the idea that “joy” is a metaphorical daughter 
who descends specifically from “Elysium” (“in the world 
of mythology, of aesthetic semblance”; Hatfield, 120). 
The poem is a good example of Schiller mixing meta-
phors in an attempt to invite the largest and most diverse 
possible audience to entertain the idea of the most daring 
ideal of a human republic (without giving censors much 
solid ground on which to stand). Here, Schiller employs a 
blur of (mostly ancient Greek and deist) metaphors for joy 
with a disorienting variety of personal pronouns (er, sie, 
es, ihn) and possessive pronouns (dein, ihr) to create a 
syllogism, concluding that the pursuit of happiness is na-
ture’s prime drive — and that any word for “gods” is a 
multidimensional metaphor for the organizing principle of 
the cosmos, which is individual joy and one of its many 
contributing conditions, political happiness.42 It follows 
that “Gott” (who is Zeus/Jupiter, a deity nobody believes 
in), “ein lieber Vater,” “der Unbekannte,” “de[r] 
Schöpfer,” “Göttern,” “de[r] gute[] Geist,” and “der 
Sternenrichter” are all metaphorical projections for the 
ultimate earthly end that humans (like worms and cher-
ubs) desire. “An die Freude” is thus first a matter of 
church and state because it is a public portrayal of pagan 
and other religious concepts as expressions of strictly 
human desires. Second, it is a matter of church and state 
because its cosmopolitan concept of brotherhood implies 
the disestablishment of cultural orthodoxies that persecute 
difference, be it the differences between beggars and 
princes or those that distinguish worms, cherubs, and 
Zeus/Jupiter. Third, it is a document of the age of secular 
revolution in that its concept of universal freedom and 
happiness displaces the coerced uniformity of the church 
state and specifically exiles those who cannot be human 
(princes and, by implication, the sexless, joyless Trinitar-
ian blur of “Die Götter Griechenlandes”): “Und wer’s nie 
gekonnt, der stehle / weinend sich aus diesem Bund!” 
(NA 1: 169). Fourth, the final instance of coerced uni-
formity of opinion and behavior — divine judgment — is 
erased in the line “richtet Gott wie wir gerichtet” (NA 
1:171), which states that humans judge first (present per-
fect) and God agrees (present tense), evidently because 
God is a projection of human beliefs. Thus, here, too, 
earthly judgment is the only judgment that matters. Fi-
nally, as Dieter Hildebrandt has documented, it is a matter 
of church and state because representatives of the most 
repressed forms of religious fundamentalist thought im-
mediately, predictably, and accurately attacked the poem 
and the poet for blasphemy.43 
 
V. 
Schiller’s subsequent early works portray a dim view of 
the fear of divine judgement and of heaven as the reward 
for a life of self-denial.44 In the poem “Resignation,” 
Schiller describes the promise of the afterlife as “Ein 
Lügenbild lebendiger Gestalten” and paints a picture of 
the afterlife as “decay” (Verwesung) “in the cold shelter 
of the grave” (in den kalten Behausungen des Grabes). 
Schiller’s poem recasts the choice between enjoying life 
on Earth, “Freude,” or waiting for happiness in eternity as 
that between self-deception, “Hoffnung,” and plausible, 
present, enjoyable reality, “Genuß” (NA 1:168). Thus, 
those who can believe are rewarded with a facile answer 
to life’s unanswerable questions; those who do not be-
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lieve are rewarded with earthly happiness: “Genieße, wer 
nicht glauben kann […] Wer glauben kann, entbehre” 
(NA 1:168). The final strophe of “Resignation” restates 
the same with even more clarity: the reward for faith is 
the absence of uncertainty; but it is a mistake to trade a 
minute of earthly happiness for the empty “shadow” 
promise of compensation from a “liar” (religion) in the 
service of “despots,”45 and whatever earthly happiness 
one denies at the moment, no eternity will give back.46 
Ergo, according to the poem, in the great decision be-
tween here and now or then and there, there is no “there.” 
This view is supported by the very clearly stated secular 
position on divine judgment: “Die Weltgeschichte ist das 
Weltgericht” (NA 1:168).47 Thus, in “Resignation,” the 
value of life, love, and morality is an earthly affair; 
Judgment Day is nothing less than a metaphor for the re-
ception of life on Earth, while divine judgment, taken lit-
erally, is nothing more than an empty threat.48 
In 1788, the once somewhat speculative evidence of 
Schiller’s hostility toward organized religion was con-
firmed to alert members of the reading public with the 
publication of “Die Götter Griechenlandes.” Again, one 
of the main topics is earthly justice and the negative func-
tion of religion. Here, the father/son/holy ghost as judge 
appears as an emotionless instance of negative duties, a 
distant and immortal (and thus alien) usurper who dis-
places the mild Greek judge, who was a mortal’s off-
spring: “Nach der Geister schrecklichen Gesetzen / 
richtete kein Heiliger Barbar” (NA 1:193). Schiller con-
trasts Christianity’s prophet-god of implausible virgin 
birth and indisputable revelation with typological, meta-
phorical, mythological, and fictional Greek heroes with 
mothers who have a healthy enough relationship to the 
sinful facts of human life to get pregnant through the tra-
ditional method. The Greek gods’ proximity to human life 
and love — “Zwischen Menschen, Göttern und Heroen / 
knüpfte Amor einen schönen Bund” (NA 1:191) — and to 
the realization of a happier human era stands in stark con-
trast to the grim, punitive, lifeless, joyless, sexless “Ent-
sagen” (NA 1:193) of Christianity. On the political free-
dom and tolerance front, embarking from the Greek 
model, Schiller establishes that tribal mythologies once 
embraced a broad spectrum of aesthetic-moral projections 
of freedom (“Vorstellungsart”; NA 25:167), and only 
later became aesthetic-moral tools of coercion in the 
hands of the church state. On a moral and legal front, 
Schiller demonstrates the inappropriateness of a divine 
judge, who could not possibly commiserate with mortal 
inhabitants of the earth, those “zarte Wesen, die ein Weib 
gebar” (NA 1:193), implying that, aside from the inevita-
ble laws of nature, only humans can (and do) give laws to 
humans. A common thread in Schiller’s criticisms is the 
belief that, by the late eighteenth century, religion had be-
come a formidable road block to both truth and true mo-
rality, which are only possible without external control of 
any kind, and specifically without church, state, and mob 
coercion.49 Again, as if to comically demonstrate the truth 
of the threat of coerced uniformity, Schiller was immedi-
ately publicly accused of blasphemy.50 According to No-
valis, as a result of the poem, Schiller was being publicly 
denounced as an atheist.51 
Reception of “Die Götter Griechenlandes” is divided 
into clear religious and secularist camps.52 In the August 
1788 edition of Deutsches Museum, poet Friedrich Leo-
pold Graf zu Stolberg (1750-1819) published the most 
prominent attack on Schiller and his “gods,” “Gedanken 
ueber Herrn Schillers Gedicht: ‘Die Götter Griechenlan-
des.’” Stolberg specifically cites the eleventh strophe as 
blasphemy, and as the demonstration of “das traurige 
Verhältnis, in welchem der Naturalist mit der Gottheit 
steht.”53 Significantly, Stolberg is offended by the phi-
losophy of the empiricist “naturalist,” who not only re-
quires no deity, since the laws of nature suffice, but who 
also believes that modern Christianity is a roadblock to 
freedom, while insisting on freedom of speech in the mat-
ter. Two contemporary defenses of freedom of speech — 
one secularist, one Christian — written by Georg Forster 
(1754-1794) and Novalis (1772-1801) come to similar 
conclusions regarding freedom of speech, despite 
Schiller’s blasphemy, anti-Christian rhetoric, and ostensi-
ble atheism. The most prominent defense of Schiller’s 
poem is Forster’s “Fragment eines Briefes an einen 
deutschen Schriftsteller über Schillers ‘Götter Griechen-
lands’” in the May 1789 edition of Neue Litteratur und 
Voelkerkunde. Whereas Schiller and Körner address only 
the freedom of speech issue, Forster directly addresses 
Stolberg’s charge of blasphemy (“Gotteslästerung”) and 
the possibility of actual charges of blasphemy (“Religi-
onsvergehen”). Significantly, Forster concedes that 
Schiller may be “ein Lästerer” (Forster 63) and “im 
Herzen ein Heide” (Forster 58), but argues that Schiller 
nonetheless has a right to his opinion and freedom of 
speech.54  
During the same period, Novalis composes both a de-
fense of Schiller’s poem – “Apologie von Friedrich 
Schiller” (Novalis 2:24-25) — and a fragmentary discus-
sion of atheism that appears to be a complementary piece 
on Schiller: “Kann ein Atheist auch moralisch tugendhaft 
aus Grundsätzen seyn?,” both undated. Novalis’ defense 
of freedom of speech indicates that contemporary criti-
cism of the poem indeed included charges of atheism. In 
his fragment on morality and atheism, Novalis recognizes 
at least two sub-categories of atheists, evidently common 
enough to distinguish — “Ich spreche nicht von Atheisten 
aus Mode sondern [von] wirklich überzeugten” – and 
proceeds to reduce atheism to two Schillerian concepts, 
the means, “virtue” — “Er fühlt die Wonne der seligen 
geräuschlosen Tugend” — and the end, “joy” — “Ein 
Atheist braucht nicht trübe zu seyn, sondern freudig, weil 
Freude ihn Gottheit ist und sie alles auf den gegenwärti-
gen Augenblick einschränken.”55 With that, Novalis de-
livers a precise and concise explanation of Schiller’s divi-
sion between the benefits of religious belief (peace of 
mind in the belief in the afterlife as sole compensation for 
joyless obedience and self-denial) and non-belief (the 
freedom to enjoy life here and now) in the poem “Resig-
nation”; and of the logic of metaphor in Schiller’s secular-
ist ode, “An die Freude,” in which all metaphysical refer-
ences are metaphors for the common goal of all existence 
– earthly happiness, that is, freedom from coercion, both 
external and internal.  
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VI. 
In the same year, in Die Geschichte des Abfalls der verei-
nigten Niederlande von der Spanischen Regierung (1788), 
Schiller elaborates on how the church state (here Philipp 
II and the Inquisition) creates the illusion of civilization 
through enforced uniformity, and how religion enslaves 
and impoverishes humanity by harnessing common hu-
man hopes and fears to terrorize and reduce populations 
to enduring ignorance and crude tribalism: 
 
Sie [die Religion] findet Hoffnung und Furcht in jede Men-
schenbrust gesäet; indem sie sich dieser Triebe bemächtigt, die-
se Triebe Einem Gegenstand unterjocht, hat sie Millionen selb-
ständiger Wesen in ein einförmiges Abstrakt verwandelt. Die 
unendliche Mannichfaltigkeit der menschlichen Willkühr ver-
wirrt ihren Beherrscher jezt nicht mehr—jezt giebt es ein allge-
meines Uebel und ein allgemeines Gut, das er zeigen und ent-
ziehen kann, das auch da, wo er nicht ist, mit ihm einverstanden 
wirket. Jezt giebt es eine Gränze, an welcher die Freiheit still 
steht, eine ehrwürdige heilige Linie, nach welcher alle strei-
tende Bewegungen des Willens zuletzt einlenken müssen. Das 
gemeinschaftliche Ziel des Despotismus und des Priesterthums 
ist Einförmigkeit, und Einförmigkeit ist ein nothwendiges 
Hülfsmittel der menschlichen Armuth und Beschränkung. (NA 
17:55) 
 
Thus, religion here results in a pseudo-civilization that 
features a philosophy based on falsehoods and the ap-
pearance of peace based on coercion. After the govern-
ment, the primary beneficiaries of this enslavement are 
the priests and, to a lesser extent, the followers of the ma-
jority sect. Schiller concludes: “Die goldene Zeit der 
Geistlichkeit fiel immer in die Gefangenschaft des 
menschlichen Geistes” (NA 17:55). 
When Heinrich Heine wrote: “Schiller schrieb für die 
großen Ideen der Revolution, er zerstörte die geistigen 
Bastillen, er baute an dem Tempel der Freiheit, und zwar 
an jenem ganz großen Tempel, der alle Nationen, gleich 
einer einzigen Brüdergemeinde, umschließen soll; er war 
Kosmopolit,”56 he was talking about the author of Don 
Karlos. It is difficult to imagine a more cosmopolitan 
drama: the story of a Spanish king, the Dutch liberation 
movement, and the universal historical causes of libera-
tion, self-determination, and the separation of church and 
state. Indeed, though the constitutional concept of the 
separation of church and state appears in a large number 
of Schiller’s literary, historical, and theatrical works, no-
where does it appear more prominently than in Don Kar-
los and in his Briefe über Don Karlos (1787), a series of 
published letters defending the unity of the drama. In the 
eighth of the Briefe über Don Karlos, Schiller moves 
quickly from the “Lieblingsgegenstand unseres Jahrhun-
derts” (NA 22:162), “die Verbreitung reinerer sanfterer 
Humanität” to “die höchstmögliche Freiheit der Indi-
viduen bei des Staats höchster Blüte” (NA 26:162). Don 
Karlos offers all the ingredients of the anti-church-state 
revolution: “Freiheitssinn mit Despotismus im Kampfe, 
die Fesseln der Dummheit zerbrochen, tausendjährige 
Vorurteile erschüttert, eine Nation, die ihre Menschen-
rechte wieder fodert, republikanische Tugenden in 
Ausübung gebracht, hellere Begriffe im Umlauf, die 
Köpfe in Gärung, die Gemüter von einem begeisterten 
Interesse gehoben” (NA 22:162). This all sounds very 
eighteenth-century, and not very sixteenth-century. In de-
fense of the untimely nature of Posa’s republicanism, 
Schiller argues that it is precisely the repressive environ-
ment of the Inquisition that inspires it, one informed by 
servitude and religion: “Das entgegengesetzte Elend der 
Sklaverei und des Aberglaubens zieht sie [seine Seele] 
immer fester und fester an diese Lieblingswelt; die schön-
sten Träume der Freiheit werden ja im Kerker geträumt. 
[…] das kühnste Ideal einer Menschenrepublik, allgemei-
ner Duldung und Gewissensfreiheit, wo konnte es besser 
und wo natürlicher zur Welt geboren werden als in der 
Nähe Philipps und seiner Inquisition?” (NA 22:141). The 
hallmark of this particular form of church-state pseudo-
civilization, as Schiller’s Marquis Posa describes it sar-
castically, is “die Ruhe eines Kirchhofs” (NA 6:190), not 
the isolation of the mere “Kerker” mentioned above, nor 
even the less specific term “Friedhof,” but the deathly si-
lence of a cemetery run by a church.  
The historical situation stands in the most grave con-
trast to Posa’s “heitre menschliche Philosophie,” a phil-
osophy of reason both humane and of human — not di-
vine — origin. The goal of this philosophy “[w]ird […] 
über den Prinzen hinaus gerückt” (NA 22:161), indeed, it 
regards “[d]as große Schicksal eines ganzen Staats, das 
Glück des menschlichen Geschlechts auf viele Genera-
tionen” (NA 22:161). The ultimate consideration is, as 
Schiller summarizes, neither friendship nor love between 
the main characters, but “ein Enthusiastischer Entwurf” 
(NA 22:164), and, according to Schiller, Posa’s path is 
not mere “Reformantenbahn” (NA 22:164), but revolution 
and constitution. The tenth letter ends with the statement 
that the close reader will recognize the principles of Mon-
tesquieu in Don Karlos, and with this Schiller can only 
mean the separation of powers and the case for constitu-
tion. The twelfth letter includes a lengthy discussion of 
the parallel significances of the deaths of Posa and 
Lykurgus as the demonstrative sacrificial means to make 
the constitution last (NA 22:174). Significantly, Schiller 
elaborates the concept of tolerance with that of freedom 
of conscience. The first instance of tolerance addressed, 
“Duldung,” is at best a practical guideline; the second, 
“Gewissensfreiheit” is a positive legal concept that is 
practically enforceable. Having established with great 
conviction in the central audience scene of Don Karlos 
that “Glückseligkeit” is the ultimate goal of Posa’s pur-
suits, here in the subsequent paragraph of the second let-
ter on Don Karlos, Schiller categorizes “Gewissensfrei-
heit” as one of the republican virtues that foremost in-
forms Posa’s thought and as the most sublime of all ideas 
(NA 22:141). In the penultimate paragraph of the second 
letter, Schiller uses the term “Wahrheit” three times to 
describe “Gewissensfreiheit,” which he concludes is the 
single republican virtue most worth dying for. This being 
the case, and since Posa’s death is the central mechanism 
of the drama, freedom of conscience is therefore arguably 
its central theme according to Schiller’s logic. 
Marquis Posa is both fictionalized and dead, but is as 
allegorically immortal as Socrates in his impenetrable vir-
tue; it is important to be clear what he died for. First, tol-
erance alone was never his ultimate goal, nor was any 
other moderate reform, nor did he die to save his friend 
Karlos, as even Philipp II recognizes in the play: “Für 
einen Knaben stirbt / ein Posa nicht” (NA 6:320). Specu-
lation in the play posits that Posa is a Protestant convert, a 
REVOLUTIONARY VIRTUE 
 
 83 
theory Posa himself disputes in his dialogue with Philipp: 
“Ihr Glaube, Sire, ist auch / der meinige” (NA 6:184). 
Thus Posa considers himself to be a Catholic, but a very 
different Catholic from those at Philipp’s court; his empa-
thy for others leads him to seek the ideal starting point for 
a republican revolution against the King of Christianity 
that will result in constitutional guarantees, as Schiller 
writes in the third letter: 
  
Der Geist der Völker wird von ihm studiert, ihre Kräfte, ihre 
Hülfsmittel abgewogen, ihre Verfassungen geprüft […] feuriger 
für dieses grosse Ganze entzündet, das ihm in so vielen Indivi-
duen vergegenwärtigt war, so kommt er jetzt von der grossen 
Ernte zurück, brennend von Sehnsucht, einen Schauplatz zu fin-
den, auf welchem er diese Ideale realisieren, diese gesammelten 
Schätze in Anwendung bringen könnte. Flanderns Zustand bietet 
sich ihm dar. Alles findet sich zu einer Revolution zubereitet. 
[…] Sein Ideal republikanischer Freiheit kann kein günstigeres 
Moment und keinen empfänglicheren Boden finden. (NA 22: 
146-147) 
 
In the ninth letter on Don Karlos, Schiller addresses the 
formula for Spanish despotism itself. If, as Schiller wrote 
in the poem “Resignation,” “religion is a liar in the serv-
ice of despots,” and if the “common aim of despotism and 
of priestcraft is uniformity, and uniformity is a necessary 
expedient of human poverty and imperfection” (NA 
17:55), then among the worst imaginable of all possible 
governments would be the worldly, supra-national despot 
in the service of the religious liar. This is how Schiller 
describes the relationship between Philipp and the Grand 
Inquisitor both in the drama (act V, scene 10; NA 6:326-
334) and in the ninth of the Briefe über Don Karlos: “den 
Despoten […], vor welchem man in fernen Weltteilen zit-
tert, sehen wir von einem herrischen Priester eine ernie-
drigende Rechenschaft ablegen und eine leichte Über-
tretung mit einer schimpflichen Züchtigung büßen” (NA 
22:166). Indeed, the final scene reinforces the fact that 
even the King of Spain himself would be better served by 
the separation of church and state. 
Since Schiller has already confirmed that (his) 
Posa’s goal (and not the goal of the Netherlands in the 
sixteenth century) is a revolution led by Karlos to realize 
eighteenth-century constitutional ideals, including free-
dom of religion, Schiller’s ostensible portrayal of six-
teenth-century Spain would appear to be just one short 
step from the separation of church and state and freedom 
from religion. In act II, scene 10, Schiller introduces the 
secular state. Here, the ultimate threat to the disingenuous 
Christians at Philipp’s court, according to the King’s Con-
fessor Domingo in his report to Duke Alba, is not the lib-
eration of the Netherlands, and neither their Protestant-
ism, nor even a merely political rebellion against Philipp 
by Prince Karlos and Marquis Posa, but the threat to the 
Inquisition’s church state posed by Karlos’ secular phil-
osophy and Posa’s vision of a republic. Domingo’s testi-
mony features the now familiar Schillerian division be-
tween the replacement virtue of faith (pseudo-civilization) 
and the new, according to Schiller in 1779, true, virtue of 
reason:  
 
Der Infant / (Ich kenn’ ihn – ich durchdringe seine Seele) / Hegt 
einen schrecklichen Entwurf — Toledo — / Den rasenden Ent-
wurf, Regent zu sein / Und unsern heil’gen Glauben zu entbeh-
ren. — / Sein Herz entglüht für eine neue Tugend, / Die, stolz 
und sicher und sich selbst genug, / Von keinem Glauben betteln 
will. — Er denkt! / Sein Kopf entbrennt von einer seltsamen / 
Chimäre — Er verehrt den Menschen — Herzog, / Ob er zu un-
serm König taugt? (NA 6:123-124).  
 
A “self-sufficient” virtue — “sich selbst genug” — is pre-
cisely the concept of virtue discussed in Schiller’s First 
Virtue Essay of 1779. Virtuous acts are, by Schiller’s 
definition, disinterested and thus free from both external 
(i.e., state or church) and internal (the imbalance of either 
reason or feeling) coercion. Indeed, the overarching goal 
of Schiller’s moral-aesthetic writings, the happiness of the 
individual through the cultivation of ennobled reason, is 
in fact diametrically opposed to the political, social, and 
private functions of organized religion. Each of these 
functions is coercive, thus each hinders progress toward 
true civic virtue, the former two through state and tribal 
enforcement, the latter one through postponing the devel-
opment of ennobled reason. Like Socrates before them, 
both Posa, and, after him, Karlos have achieved this free-
dom from external and internal forms of coercion and are 
prepared to die for the freedom of others before Posa is 
shot dead and Karlos arrested for offenses punishable by 
death. 
The untimely demand for the separation of church 
and state in sixteenth-century Spain would seem alienat-
ing if not for the fact that Schiller had already long estab-
lished a consistent program of (and an uncanny ability 
for) weaving a number of historical and metaphorical 
models together to create a singular transcendent impres-
sion. As ever, Schiller is much less interested in historical 
truth within historical context than he is in the contempo-
rary and future value of poetic and philosophical truth, 
which is the point of his practiced form of universal his-
tory.57 Throughout the play, Schiller combines the prob-
lems of the Dutch provinces with the Scottish Enlighten-
ment “happiness” rhetoric of the American War of Lib-
eration, most notably purposefully using the English royal 
address form “Sire” in Posa’s dialogue with Philipp II. In 
a letter of 21 May 1787, Schiller complains to his pub-
lisher Göschen that the editing of Don Karlos has resulted 
in a problem regarding the royal form of address: “Bei 
Sire ist das e weggestrichen, welches ein Hauptfehler ist 
denn Sire ohne e heißt bloss Herr im englischen. Sire mit 
e heißt Ew, Majestät” (NA 24: 97). It is telling that 
Schiller’s Spanish king bears an English title in a drama 
begun before the American War of Liberation against 
England concluded in 1783, a war of political autonomy 
that simultaneously liberated the new United States from 
the Church of England, as documented in Thomas Jeffer-
son’s “Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom” (drafted in 
1777, enacted in 1786) and the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution (drafted in 1789, enacted in 1791). In 
short, the lessons of the liberation of the Netherlands from 
a church state are most timely in the 1780s, providing a 
vehicle for art that educates the individual in the contem-
porary context between the American War of Independ-
ence and the French Revolution.  
Posa states of his own time: “Das Jahrhundert / ist 
meinem Ideal nicht reif. Ich lebe / ein Bürger derer, 
welche kommen werden” (NA 6:185). A moment later, he 
prophesizes the end of absolutist tyranny and a future cen-
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tury of reconciliation between the state and the individual: 
“Sanftere / Jahrhunderte verdrängen Philips Zeiten; / die 
bringen mildre Weisheit; Bürgerglück / wird dann 
versöhnt mit Fürstengröße wandeln, / der karge Staat mit 
seinen Kindern geitzen, / und die Nothwendigkeit wird 
menschlich sein” (NA 6:189). Finally, just before his 
death, in act IV, scene 21, Posa reconciles himself with 
the possibility of the short-term failure of his vision for 
the Netherlands, but its realization for millions within 
centuries: “Er mache — / O, sagen Sie es ihm! das 
Traumbild wahr, / das kühne Traumbild eines neuen 
Staates, / der Freundschaft göttliche Geburt. Er lege / die 
erste Hand an diesen rohen Marmor. / Ob er vollende oder 
unterliege — / ihm einerlei! Er lege Hand an. Wenn / 
Jahrhunderte dahin geflohen, wird / die Vorsicht einen 
Fürstensohn, wie er, / auf einem Thron, wie seiner, wied-
erholen, / und ihren neuen Liebling mit derselben / Be-
geisterung entzünden” (NA 6:268-269). Both text inter-
nally (European history), as Posa indicates, and text ex-
ternally (the European present), it is only logical that 
Schiller’s concern is not late sixteenth-century Spain, but 
late eighteenth-century humankind: whatever a Philipp 
does to hinder progress, ideas cannot be stopped, and 
ideas will lead to actions, as Posa informs Philipp in act 
III, scene 10: “Sie wollen / allein in ganz Europa — Sich 
dem Rade / des Weltverhängnisses, das unaufhaltsam / in 
vollem Laufe rollt, entgegen werfen? / mit Menschenarm 
in seine Speichen fallen? / Sie warden nicht” (NA 6:190). 
Progress will come, whether through revolution by the 
current Karlos or by a future Karlos. As Schiller wrote to 
Goethe on 27 March 1801: “Aus der Idee aber kann ohne 
die That nichts werden” (NA 29:26). Whether they suc-
ceed or fail, the thinker, Schiller, and the doers, Karlos 
and Posa, begin to chisel this raw stone with a mad vision 
of individual freedom of, freedom to, and, most impor-
tantly, freedom from the subject-external belief systems 
addressed in Posa’s demand to Philipp II in the name of 
millions who suffer oppression at the hands of the church 
state: “Geben Sie Gedankenfreiheit —” (NA 6:191).58 
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